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The Melanesian Spearhead Group in terms of Indonesia’s interest
Abstract: This qualitative study aims to encompass Indonesia’s interest in seeking to join the MSG 
(Melanesian Spearhead Group). An in-depth interview was carried out with the Director of Directorate 
General of Asia, Pacific, and Africa under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indone-
sia aiming to obtain valid data supported by literature reviews. The findings indicate that Indonesia’s 
attempts to join the MSG or Melanesian intergovernmental organizations basically aim to maintain 
domestic stability which, in this context, refers to closing down separatist movements that still exist in 
Indonesia, such as the FPM (Free Papua Movement), that explicitly receive international support from 
Melanesian countries sharing the same racial background. In an effort to preserve the country’s sover-
eignty, Indonesia, in the era of President Joko Widodo, strives to join the MSG to prevent the Melane-
sian intergovernmental organization from supporting such separatist groups, which from Indonesia’s 
perspective could disrupt the unity of the Republic of Indonesia.
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Introduction
Historically, the close relations between Indonesia and South Pacific countries were actually established in 1984 as the issue of Irian Jaya (nowadays known as Papua) 
gradually emerged. This issue was triggered by the armed acts of aggression performed 
by the Free Papua Movement (FPM) through numerous attacks aimed at Indonesian 
military, civilians, and transmigration facilities in various villages in Irian Jaya.
These attacks could eventually be stopped by Indonesian military. However, this 
counterattack raised serious concerns in relations between Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea. This was due to the fact that, when running from armed aggression to state bor-
der areas, the members of the FPM incited surrounding communities by saying that In-
donesian military would conduct a counterattack upon them. This later became a trigger 
to the massive influx of refugees to the territory of Papua New Guinea and sparked off 
many refugee issues for the government of Papua New Guinea (Harris, Brown, 1985).
The government of Papua New Guinea, as a consequence, provided refugee camps 
for Irian Jaya people who entered the territory of Papua New Guinea; nevertheless, this 
led to various problems around the camps, such as violence perpetrated by some refu-
gees upon Indonesian journalists who were reporting the refugees’ condition at that time. 
On the other hand, the government of Papua New Guinea claimed that Indonesian Air 
Force had launched bomb attacks on their territory in pursuit of FPM members.
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The Indonesian government in responding to this claim initiated a diplomatic and 
military solution to rectify the situation which was eventually resolved peacefully. Such 
peaceful resolution became an initial phase of close relations between Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea. Even afterwards, these two countries made several agreements in-
cluding the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation, and Status of Forces 
Agreement (Hamid, 1996).
Studying the above phenomena, the Indonesian government finally decided to pay 
more attention to the South Pacific region. This was stated in the Guidelines of State 
Policy (GBHN) of 1983 and 1988, which disclosed that the South Pacific region was 
becoming an area of Indonesian foreign policy that must be specifically targeted. In the 
GBHN 1993, it was also asserted that collaboration among Asia-Pacific countries must 
be improved.
After several regime shifts, Indonesia was again surprised by the statement of the 
Prime Minister of one of the South Pacific countries, namely the Prime Minister of Vanu-
atu, Moana Carcasses Katokai Kalosil at the 25th UN Summit for Human Rights. He 
delivered a speech urging the international community to support Papua Independence 
since the Papua people, from his perspective, had been oppressed by the Indonesian 
government for almost fifty years. According to him, even Pepera (Collecting Popular 
Opinion) in 1969, in which a majority preferred to join Indonesia, was no more than 
a manipulative intrigue by the Indonesian government.
Referring to this statement, the Indonesian government eventually decided to join 
the MSG (Melanesian Spearhead Group) – a Melanesian intergovernmental organiza-
tion. On July 2, 2015, Indonesia was finally accepted as a Permanent Member of the 
MSG along with Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Archipelago, Vanuatu, and New 
Caledonia.
This paper primarily focuses on the aspects underlying the Indonesian policy of join-
ing the MSG, despite the fact that this organization is rather small and consists of coun-
tries with unstable economies.
Review of related literature
The Adaptive Model of Foreign Policy
In the studies on foreign policy, a state is assumed to be a social institution in two 
environments. The first environment is known as the domestic (internal) environment 
while the second is known as the foreign (external) environment. In regard to this, when 
creating foreign policies a state has to adapt to both the internal and external environ-
ments, since every policy issued will surely have an impact on both (Brown, Kirsten, 
2005).
Essentially, every foreign policy issued by a state appears to be a state’s adaptation 
to both the internal and external environments. There are four possible patterns of adap-
tation of a state’s foreign policy as a response to various issues coming from either the 
internal or external environment (Rosenau, 1974). First, there is preservative adaption 
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as a response given by a state in reacting to demands and changes coming from both 
internal and external aspects. In other words, this pattern basically occurs as a result of 
demands and changes coming from internal and external aspects. Second, acquiescent 
adaptation is a response given by a state in reacting to demands and changes coming 
from the external environment. Third, intransigent adaptation is a response given by 
a state in reacting to demands and changes coming from the internal environment; and 
last, promotive adaptation is an absence of a state’s responses in reacting to demands and 
changes coming from both internal and external environments.
This paper uses the preservative adaptation model to analyze the Indonesian for-
eign policy of joining the MSG in the era of President Joko Widodo, since it cannot be 
separated from the internal demand coming from the separatist movement in Indonesia 
which, in this case, refers to the attempts by the Free Papua Movement (FPM) to sepa-
rate from the Republic of Indonesia by committing numerous acts of terror and causing 
insecurity in Papua. On the other hand, the external demand can be seen in the attempt of 
Melanesian countries, especially Vanuatu, through their Prime Ministers, to support and 
urge Indonesia to give independence to Papua.
Methodology
Data Collecting Method
This paper aims to establish the major reason why Indonesia strove to become an 
MSG member. Thus, to work out this reason, it employs a data collecting method involv-
ing an in-depth interview with the Director of the Directorate General of Asia-Pacific 
and Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. Besides the 
in-depth interview, data was also collected from documentation. These two methods are 
important in obtaining valid data as to the reasons underlying the Indonesian government 
to join the MSG.
Data Analysis
The data was analyzed in the following phases:
1) the data collected by various methods, including interview, literature reviews, and 
so on, was read and studied rigorously in order to be used as the primary conceptual 
framework and to provide valid data for further study;
2) the data was further reduced and arranged systematically to grasp the main points that 
become the major focus in this study. This aims to promote a valid overview of the 
phenomena observed;
3) the reduced data was arranged in categories, to determine or define each unit or ca-
tegory. Each category was subsequently coded to be easily controlled and used at 
any time, and hence can be referred to as a basic framework to make data analysis 
easier.
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Findings
FPM Separatist Movement in Indonesia
A separatist movement can be defined as “political self-expression” performed by 
a group with particular characteristics in a specific territory (Horowitz, 1981). In regard 
to this, the Free Papua Movement can be categorized as a separatist movement, as its 
members consistently express their desire to separate from the Republic of Indonesia 
either through soft or hard actions.
In terms of soft action, the Free Papua Movement has persuaded the Papuan people 
to hate the Indonesian central government. They argue that the central government has 
demonstrated various discriminative actions towards Papua people, for instance: using 
Papua as a Military Operations Area (MOA), giving ownership of Freeport to foreigners 
so that it is not beneficial for the Papuan people, and so on. These attempts to influence 
the Papuan people have ultimately been successful in increasing the number of FPM 
sympathizers and triggering almost all Papuan people to think negatively about the In-
donesian central government (Raweyai, Suprantio, 2002).
Meanwhile, in terms of hard action, the Free Papua Movement, along with their sym-
pathizers, have engaged in various acts of military aggression, through attacks against 
the security forces and public facilities in Papua. If we refer to news stories in the mass 
media, there is an attack by the Free Papua Movement reported every year. For example, 
on January 7, 2014, the Free Papua Movement was reported to have shot a Susi Air 
aircraft that was carrying foods from Nabire. Further, on January 9, 2014, there was an 
act of armed aggression by the Free Papua Movement aimed at the office of Indonesian 
National Armed Forces (TNI-Polri) in East Tanggul. In the same month, on January 18, 
2014, the Kompas Office, under the Military District Commands 1714/PJ in Lama Mu-
lia City, the District of Puncak Jaya, was attacked by the Free Papua Movement (Lita, 
2017).
Such aggressive actions carried out by the Free Papua Movement cannot be separated 
from their goal of achieving Papuan independence from the Indonesian government and 
of establishing an independent and sovereign state (Tebay, 2005). From the author’s 
point of view, this seems plausible since they are never treated fairly in the distribution 
of resources. Another thing is that Indonesia has adopted the wrong approach (using the 
military) since the beginning, when the Indonesian government considered Papua as one 
of the Indonesian provinces.
Those aggressive actions carried out by the Free Papua Movement, in the internal 
context, can be categorized as separatist attempts that threaten Indonesian sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, such actions, in their opinion, have not yet sufficed and therefore they seek 
support from other countries, especially countries populated mainly by people of same 
race, which in this case are the Melanesian countries.2
2 Etymologically, “Melanesian” comes from two words “melas” or “mela” which means black, 
and “nesos” or “nesoi” which means archipelago. Generally, Melanesian community is characterized 
as a community with dark skin complexion and curly hair (Wardhani, 2015a).
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The Free Papua Movement in Seeking Support  
from the Melanesian Spearhead Group
As mentioned in the previous section, the FPM’s attempts to secede from Indonesia 
cannot be detached from their main goal of establishing an independent state, and one 
of requirements for this independence, in terms of international law, is the acknowl-
edgement by other countries. Realizing such a requirement, the Free Papua Movement 
attempts to seek support from other countries, especially those in the South Pacific re-
gion. This is understandable, since the Free Papua Movement feels a racial kinship with 
Melanesian countries.
The initial step taken by the Free Papua Movement was applying for membership of 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), which is a South Pacific regional organization 
established in Port Vila on March 14, 1988, by the heads of governments of Melanesian 
countries such as Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Solomon Island (Wardhani, 2015b). 
This application for membership can be interpreted as the FPM’s attempt to seek support 
from the Melanesian Spearhead Group.
The membership application by the FPM was submitted by the biggest organiza-
tion affiliated under the FPM banner, which is the West Papua National Coalition for 
Liberation (WPNCL) in June, 2013. However, this submission triggered disputes within 
the FPM, considering that other organizations felt more entitled to submit such an ap-
plication to the MSG. This eventually led the MSG to reject the application, due to the 
consideration that having an official organization is the main requirement for joining the 
MSG (O’Neill, 2014).
The above condition ultimately led FPM leaders to establish an official organization in 
December 2014 to represent their voice, known as The United Liberation Movement for 
West Papua (ULMWP). In 2015, after the establishment of this organization, the member-
ship application to the MSG was accepted and they became an Observer Member in June, 
2015. This finally triggered a lot of support from Melanesian countries, which could be 
seen later in some of the attitudes of leaders and civil society in those countries.
Support from Melanesian Countries in the MSG to the Free Papua Movement
The FPM’s attempts to seek support from countries with similar racial composition 
ultimately achieved their goals, i.e. they received a lot of support from Vanuatu. This in-
dicates that the Melanesian race in the South Pacific region view Indonesia as a common 
enemy. Vanuatu, in particular, uses the issues of human rights violations in Papua in the 
pre-reform era as a major concern to corner Indonesia in international forums.
Other support for the FPM comes from church forums in the Solomon Islands, 
through Peter Houhou, the Deputy General of the Dariss Anglican Archdiocese. He as-
serts: “We in the Solomon Islands have heard the cries of the people of West Papua and 
we commit to advocating their inherent right to gainful political self-determination and 
true freedom” (SICA supports freedom for West Papua people, 2014).
Furthermore, Nauru also officially declared their support for the FPM through 
a speech delivered at the Pacific Islands Forum Summit (KTT PIF) in 2000 in Tarawa, 
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Kiribati. The President of Nauru himself, Bernard Dowiyogo, delivered a speech on 
September  7, 2000, at the United Nations Millennium Summit arguing that Indonesia 
is indeed a colonial country in Papua. Tuvalu became the next country to give support 
to the FPM, despite its limited capacity, in the form of financial backing (Wardhani, 
2015a).
Such support as outlined above eventually triggered Indonesia to react, by striving to 
join the MSG in order to prevent further support being given by Melanesian countries to 
the Free Papua Movement.
Indonesian Foreign Policies in the Melanesian Region
After the emergence of various forms of support from Melanesian countries for the 
FPM, the initial attempt of the Indonesian government to prevent this was by improving 
the image of Indonesia, which Melanesian countries deem to be a country with a record 
of massive human rights crimes, especially against the people of Papua.
This attempt was made by joining the Melanesian Spearhead Group, despite the 
membership application submitted by the FPM to the organization. Indonesia submitted 
its membership application in 2010, although this received strong opposition from Vanu-
atu. However, in 2011 Indonesia was finally accepted and became an Observer Member. 
In this regard, Indonesia was supported by Fiji and Papua New Guinea.
The status of Observer Member enables Indonesia to become an observer of all ac-
tivities in the Melanesian Spearhead Group. Indonesia still does not have the same rights 
and obligations as other member countries, such as in the case of voting (the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2017).
After becoming an Observer Member, Indonesia invited MSG member countries to 
visit Papua and directly observe the actual situation. After this visit, the MSG started to 
perceive Papua as one of the Indonesian provinces whose development was very good, 
and even better than that of other MSG member countries (Azizian, Cramer, 2015).
After the visit, Indonesia advanced to the status of Associate Member in 2015. As 
stated by the Director of the Directorate General of Asia-Pacific and Africa at the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, both active participation and inten-
sive lobbying of Indonesian delegations, consisting of representatives from five prov-
inces with Melanesian cultures (North Maluku, Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara, Papua, and 
West Papua) has successfully allowed Indonesia to become an Associate Member in the 
MSG (Percaya, 2016).
Since becoming an Associate Member, Indonesia’s bargaining power in the MSG 
has gradually been increasing, since Indonesia can propose requirements and actively 
participate in every MSG activity. This essentially means that Indonesia can monitor the 
direction of MSG policies in the future, so that Indonesia can readily prepare various 
policy formulas in case MSG policies are counter to the national interest.
Generally, Indonesia’s interest in joining the Melanesian Spearhead Group has fi-
nally been realized, as stated by the Director of the Directorate General of Asia-Pacific 
and Africa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the interview, where he said that the 
acceptance of Indonesia as an Associate Member and the rejection of the FPM’s goal to 
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become a Permanent Member of the MSG shows that Indonesia’s interest in maintaining 
national sovereignty has been achieved (Percaya, 2016).
Discussion and conclusion
The Indonesian foreign policy of joining the Melanesian Spearhead Group cannot 
be separated from the gradually intensifying activities of the Free Papua Movement in 
Papua, which potentially disturb national stability and sovereignty. On the other hand, 
Indonesia’s decision to become a member of the MSG cannot be detached from the sup-
port given by Melanesian countries to the FPS in Papua.
In regard to this support, the best decision that can be taken by Indonesia is to ap-
proach those countries, even if the organization does not ensure such benefits as the 
ASEAN, for instance. However, despite the organization’s economic insignificance, 
membership of the MSG can make it easier for Indonesia to take part (or influence) any 
policies issued by the MSG, by providing financial support to member countries. This 
surely will have a positive impact on Indonesia’s image in the South Pacific region, es-
pecially in Melanesia.
Finally, it can be concluded that Indonesia has successfully protected or maintained 
its national sovereignty from the aggressive manoeuvers of separatist movements, such 
as the Free Papua Movement. This is evidenced by the rejection of the ULMWP’s pro-
posal to make it a permanent member in the Melanesian Spearhead Group. Therefore, 
it can be said that the MSG acknowledges Indonesia as its member, rather than the UL-
MWP.
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Międzyrządowa organizacja państw melanezyjskich (Melanesian Spearhead Group) 
 a interes Indonezji 
 
Streszczenie
Artykuł przedstawia analizę jakościową korzyści, jakie upatruje Indonezja w członkostwie 
w międzyrządowej organizacji państw melanezyjskich (Melanesian Spearhead Group). Na podstawie 
pogłębionego wywiadu, przeprowadzonego z Dyrektorem Departamentu Azji, Państw Pacyfiku i Afry-
ki w Ministerstwie Spraw Zagranicznych Republiki Indonezji, otrzymano aktualne dane, potwierd-
zone następnie literaturą przedmiotu. W rezultacie stwierdzono, że zasadniczym celem indonezyjskich 
starań o wstąpienie do MSG (międzyrządowej organizacji państw melanezyjskich) było utrzymanie 
wewnętrznej stabilizacji, co w tym kontekście odnosi się do wygaszenia działalności wciąż aktywnych 
w Indonezji ruchów separatystycznych, takich jak FPM (Ruch Wolnej Papui), otwarcie wspieranych 
przez państwa melanezyjskie, z którymi łączy je pochodzenie rasowe. Zabiegając o zachowanie 
suwerenności państwa, Indonezja pod rządami Prezydenta Joko Widodo, próbuje wstąpić do grupy 
MSG, aby zapobiec dalszemu wspieraniu grup separatystycznych przez tę międzyrządową organizację 
państw melanezyjskich, której działania mogą z punktu widzenia Indonezji zachwiać jednością Repub-
liki Indonezji.
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Spearhead Group), separatystyczny
Article submitted: 14.02.2018; article: 17.04.2018.
